Abstract On 17 March 2011 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 authorizing member states to take forceful measures to protect Libyan civilians. Clearly NATO actions to protect civilians were within the mandate. But the authors claim that operations aiming at overthrowing the Qaddafi regime were illegal use of force. The overstepping of the mandate may have a negative effect on the credibility of the responsibility to protect in future gross human rights violations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The peaceful protests against the 42-year-old rule of Qaddafi started on 15 February 2011 when Libyans in the city of Benghazi gathered in demonstration against the arrest of a human rights campaigner. On 17 February, known as Libya's 'Day of Rage', Libyans in a number of towns and cities demonstrated for democratic change and respect for human rights. 1 The unarmed protesters were met with violent crackdowns by the Libyan authorities and the situation in Libya rapidly turned into a mass revolt. 2 Within a few weeks, the demonstrators started an armed rebellion, gained control of several towns and cities and established a Transitional National Council. Government forces quickly responded, pushing the rebels back and retaking control of many of the areas previously under rebel control. 3 The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported about ill-treatment, beatings, injuries, rapes, torture, killings, enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrests of protesters including lawyers, human rights defenders and journalists. 4 Reports further said that Libyan forces fired at random on protesters and bystanders from rooftops and tanks and used warplanes and helicopters to strike at demonstrators. 5 The Libyan authorities also used foreign mercenaries and there was a massive passage of weapons to Libyan territory. 6 The Libyan government moreover attempted to restrict the broadcasting of the situation in the country by cutting off landlines and internet access and by restricting media coverage. 7 Condemnations of the violent suppression by the Qaddafi regime mounted from both the UN and regional organizations, including the African Union, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. On 22 February 2011 the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 8 Navi Pillay, called for an immediate cessation of the human rights violations committed by Libyan authorities. 9 On the same day the Arab League decided to suspend Libya from the organization, 10 the UN Security Council issued a statement urging the Libyan authorities to 'meet its responsibility to protect its population' 11 and the Organization of the Islamic Conference uttered that it 'considers the ongoing coercion and oppression in Libya as a humanitarian catastrophe'. 12 On 24 February the African Union condemned 'the disproportionate use of force' against Libyan civilians. 13 The situation in Libya combined with the calls for action from various regional organizations led the Security Council to unanimously adopt Resolution 1970 on 26 February. 14 Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the Council demanded 'an immediate end to the violence' and authorized measures short of armed force, including an arms embargo, freezing of Libyan assets, bans on travel for key Libyan leaders as well as referring the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Despite the implementation of measures pursuant to Resolution 1970 and the international condemnations, the Libyan government continued the brutalities against its own people and called on its supporters to attack the demonstrators. 15 The regional organizations thus saw the need for stronger international pressure and by early March the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organization of Islamic Conference endorsed a no-fly zone, followed on 12 March by the Arab League's call for a no-fly zone in combination with the establishment of safe areas. 16 With columns of pro-government forces closing in on the rebel-held city of Benghazi in mid-March, the rebels' plea for military protection was augmented. 17 On 17 March, speaking on a radio show in Tripoli, Qaddafi raised the levels of urgency of the situation. He threatened civilians living in areas that refused to comply with his rule, declaring 'We will come house by house, room by room . . . We will find you in your 6 OHCHR, Libya: '"Stop the Massacre" -UN experts' (22 February 2011) 22 The concept of the 'responsibility to protect' was endorsed and defined by the UN General Assembly at the World Summit in 2005. 23 It stipulates that the primary responsibility to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity rests on the territorial state. If the territorial state is unwilling or unable to fulfil its responsibility then it is for the international community to act in its place, including by action of the Security Council. Resolution 1973 represents the first mandate by the Security Council for a military intervention based on the responsibility to protect against the wishes of a functioning government.
Shortly after Resolution 1973 was passed, disagreement emerged on the scope and limits of the mandate and already on the day the aerial attacks on Libya started, concerns were raised about military overreach. The Chinese government expressed regret at the American and European assault on Libya and Russia condemned the attack. 24 The African Union had rejected military intervention in Libya 25 and stressed that only dialogue and consultation could bring solutions in Libya. 26 On 2 November the Prosecutor of the ICC briefed the Security Council saying that the allegations of crimes committed by NATO and the National Transitional Councilrelated forces would be examined impartially and independently by the ICC's Office of Prosecution. 27 This article addresses whether the bombing carried out by NATO and its allies during the armed conflict in Libya was within the legal mandate provided by UNSC Resolution 1973. For the purpose of assessing the legality, the military operations will be divided into three phases. In phase one, NATO launched airstrikes at Qaddafi's forces attacking the rebels. Phase two covers NATO military operations during the alleged stalemate between the combating forces. Phase three concerns NATO airstrikes while the rebels advanced on territories controlled by Qaddafi's forces. The article does not discuss whether NATO violated international humanitarian law.
We argue that NATO actions to protect civilians were clearly within the mandate. But operations aiming at overthrowing Qaddafi, including support to the rebels' advancement in phase three, violated the mandate and were an illegal use of force. The overstepping of the mandate may have undermined the credibility of the responsibility to protect in future humanitarian crises.
II. THE LEGALITY OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS

A. NATO Halting Attacks by Qaddafi's Forces
In phase one of Operation Unified Protector NATO and its allies launched a number of airstrikes at various ground-based devices, systems and heavy artillery of the Qaddafi regime, as well as enforcing the no-fly zone. The rebels showed a low level of military effectiveness at the time. However, allied air attacks against government forces surrounding Benghazi and other rebel-held cities, as well as masses of loyalist forces within, reinforced the rebels.
Constituting the legal mandate of the military operation in Libya, UNSC Resolution 1973 paragraph 4 authorized UN member states 'to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi'. The reference to 'all necessary measures' means that NATO enjoyed wide discretion in its choice of forcible means. The only specifically excluded measure in paragraph 4 is the deployment of 'a foreign occupation force' on Libyan territory.
But, importantly, paragraph 4 establishes a distinction between the authorized measures and the objective to be achieved. The authorization 'to take all necessary measures' is directly linked to the protection of 'civilians and civilian populated areas . . ., including Benghazi'. Only military measures directed at achieving civilian protection are legally recognized through the mandate in paragraph 4. Military measures taken in pursuance of other aims will represent a breach of paragraph 4 and will amount to an unlawful 'threat or use of force' against the targeted state under the UN Charter Article 2(4).
Paragraph 4 decides that the objective of protection comprises 'civilians and civilian populated areas . . ., including Benghazi'. International humanitarian law defines 'civilians' in international armed conflicts as all those who do not participate in the armed forces of any party or are members of militias belonging to a party to the conflict. 28 There is, however, no agreed definition of 'civilians' in non-international armed conflicts. 29 But it is accepted in both international and non-international armed conflicts that civilians are not protected against attacks 'for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities'. 30 Similarly, civilians taking direct part in hostilities should The objects of protection under paragraph 4 also include 'civilian populated areas'. An ordinary reading of the phrase indicates that it is about protecting specific geographical areas. This understanding coincides with that of the French representative in the Security Council meeting adopting Resolution 1973 who stated that the resolution authorizes member states to resort to all necessary measures 'to protect civilians and territories'. 32 The reference to 'civilian populated areas' is thus about protecting geographical zones populated by civilians, including towns and cities. Regardless of whether attacks on such inhabited territories are being directed at civilians or at military objects recognized as legitimate under international humanitarian law, the mandate of paragraph 4 allows for protection. This widely extends the mandate, permitting NATO and its allies to also protect cities and towns held by rebel force as well as protecting rebel forces present in such areas.
The mandate of paragraph 4 finally includes the protection of the city Benghazi. As a populated territory the city already enjoyed protection under the term 'civilian populated areas'. Nevertheless, by making a particular reference to Benghazi in Resolution 1973, the Security Council sent a clear message to Qaddafi. If Qaddafi did not immediately pull back his forces from the announced massive assault on Benghazi, NATO would initiate a military operation to secure its protection. The rapid advance of the Qaddafi forces to within striking distance of the rebel-held city of one million people had created an urgent need for protection and there was no room for ambiguities as to the legality of protecting Benghazi. 33 On the one hand, the inclusion of 'civilian populated areas . . ., including Benghazi' in paragraph 4 expands the protection mandate from covering solely those who are covered by the term 'civilians' under international humanitarian law. On the other hand, the explicit reference to these areas implies a restrictive interpretation of the mandate. It only licenses protection of these three explicitly mentioned objects. The mandate does not authorize military measures to protect the whole population or the entire geographical territory of Libya.
Moreover, paragraph 4 limits the scope of protection to situations where civilians and civilian populated areas, including Benghazi, are 'under threat of attack'. The expression shows that the mandate not only includes actual attacks, it also covers situations when civilians or populated territories are exposed to a threat of attack. under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is a 'declared readiness of a State to use force'. 34 A 'threat' involves a communicated hostile determination or intention. This communication may be expressed or implied. The existence of a threat must be determined on the basis of whether there are reasonable grounds for such a perception. The significance of the condition of an 'attack' is that the mandate only permits NATO to conduct military operations to prevent or halt attacks, or threats of attacks, posed by either party to the Libyan conflict. There is no definition of the word 'attack' in Resolution 1973, nor in the UN Charter. But international humanitarian law establishes that civilians 'shall not be the object of attack'. 35 'Attack' is defined in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions as 'acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence'. 36 This has been taken to mean 'combat action' 37 or 'the use of armed forces'. 38 Similarly, 'attack' under paragraph 4 of Resolution 1973 should be taken to mean the use of military force against 'civilians and civilian populated areas'.
At the time NATO and its allies initiated airborne attacks on pro-Qaddafi forces in the city of Misrata, the city had already been under attack by government tanks and artillery for several days. 39 This was also the case when NATO began its airstrikes of Qaddafi's troops within Ajdabiua, where government soldiers, tanks and warplanes had been bombarding the town. 40 When carrying out military airborne action to protect these cities as well as other populated areas from ongoing attacks by government forces, NATO and its allies acted within the mandate in paragraph 4.
When it comes to Benghazi, Qaddafi had not initiated attacks on the city. But although Libya's Foreign Minister, Khalid Kaim, had announced that the government was ready for a ceasefire with the rebels, Qaddafi's forces continued to advance swiftly toward Benghazi. In his speech on a radio show in Tripoli on 17 March, Qaddafi announced his readiness to ruthlessly assault the city of Benghazi the very same night, 'It's over. The issue has been decided', he said, offering amnesty to those who laid down their arms. 41 44 On 11 April 2011 a delegation led by South African President Jacob Zuma emerged as a peace broker in Libya, suggesting an immediate ceasefire and dialogue aimed at reconciling the two parties of the conflict. 45 Although the delegation managed to persuade Qaddafi to agree to a mediation plan, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the Transitional National Council's chairman, rejected the peace initiative because it did not require Qaddafi to immediately relinquish power while both sides negotiated. 46 The rebels further rejected the peace initiative as it did not require Qaddafi to withdraw his forces and it required a cessation of NATO air strikes. 47 In addition, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the NATO Secretary General, considered that it was 'too early' for a ceasefire because for a ceasefire to be credible 'an effective monitoring mechanism' needed to be established. 48 On 14 and 15 April 2011, NATO held an informal meeting in Berlin of NATO foreign ministers and non-NATO members participating in the Libyan conflict to discuss the alliance's military involvement in the country. 49 The US and other NATO allies rejected the French and British calls for them to contribute more to the air campaign to help break the ongoing military stalemate.
On 14 April 2011 US President Barack Obama, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron published a joint article in several newspapers. The three state leaders pledged that NATO would protect civilians and stated that 'so long as Qaddafi is in power, NATO must maintain its operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds'. They acknowledged that 'our duty and our mandate under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 are to protect civilians and we are doing that. It is not to remove Qaddafi by force'. Nevertheless, they claimed that 'it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with 42 Qaddafi in power' and that a genuine transition from dictatorship to an inclusive constitutional process could only really begin when Qaddafi had resigned. 50 The ambiguity of this article is striking. On the one hand, it is argued that the mandate does not include the removal of Qaddafi; on the other, it is stated that NATO will maintain its operations and increase the pressure on the regime as long as Qaddafi is in power.
Russia had from the beginning of the operation been wary of any signs of mission creep and had called for a political solution. In a news conference in Berlin on 15 April 2011, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the operation should 'proceed with a political and diplomatic settlement'. He added that 'The UN has not authorized regime change'. 51 NATO Secretary-General Fogh Rasmussen responded by reiterating that the operation did not exceed the UN mandate 52 and on 19 April Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard explained that 'NATO will continue its campaign to degrade the Qaddafi regime forces that are involved in the on-going attacks on civilians'. 53 On 19 April 2011 NATO aircraft conducted multiple strikes against command and control facilities of the Qaddafi regime, including communications infrastructure used to coordinate attacks. 54 On 25 April NATO aircraft destroyed an office building in Qaddafi's Bab al-Azizia complex in Tripoli. 55 Again on 30 April NATO bombed another building in the complex, killing one of Qaddafi's sons and three grandchildren. 56 NATO held that the last attack was a precision strike against the Qaddafi regime's military installations, including targeting a known command-and-control building in the Bab al-Azizia complex. NATO held that the strikes were legal as the targets were in command and control of forces attacking civilians. 57 On 1 May British Prime Minister Cameron argued that the attacks were in line with the UN mandate of Resolution 1973. The command and control centres were part of Qaddafi's war-making machine and by its attacks NATO were preventing loss of civilian life, Cameron said. 58 The already sceptical states became even less convinced as NATO took a more offensive approach. China and Russia repeatedly disputed the allies' interpretation of the resolution, accusing NATO of overstepping Resolution 1973. At a news conference on 26 April 2011, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin held that NATO had exceeded the mandate, escalating its action from civilian protection to killing Qaddafi and enforcing a regime change. Putin expressed outrage over the destruction of Libya's infrastructure and said that 'in essence one of the warring sides is attacking under the cover of aircraft'. 59 In a statement on 30 June, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said that his country 'urges the international community to strictly abide by the spirit of the relevant UN Security Council resolution and not take any actions that exceed the authority granted by that resolution. We have always urged a political 
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International and Comparative Law Quarterly solution to the current crisis in Libya, so that Libya returns to peace and stability as soon as possible'. 60 The African Union stated that 'a verifiable and internationally-monitored ceasefire is key, both to creating conducive conditions for successful negotiations among the Libyan parties and also to ensuring the protection of the civilian population, which is the very purpose for which resolution 1973 (2011) Colonel Qaddafi has been killing his own people'. 65 It could be argued that removing Qaddafi was necessary to protect Libyan civilians from future attacks. Qaddafi himself had announced his preparedness to continue fighting to retain power in Libya. Clearly a regime change would protect civilians. By enforcing a regime change, NATO would remove the greatest threat on the Libyan civilians, Qaddafi.
Nevertheless, what is decisive for the lawfulness of the military activities is that the mandate strictly limits military activities to those directed to achieve protection of 'civilians and civilian populated areas' under 'threat of attack'. The lawful aim was neither general human rights protection in Libya nor to bring down the Qaddafi regime -or to enforce democracy.
C. NATO Assisting Rebels towards Regime Change
NATO provided for the high-precision strike capabilities that the rebel commanders needed. 66 The rebels were also rapidly improving their operations, especially in combat coordination, due to covert deployment of foreign military advisors and special agents from both France and Britain who trained the rebels and provided tactical intelligence for the NATO aircraft bombing forces. 67 Moreover, the rebels received secret airdrops of weapons and ammunition, admitted both by France and Qatar. 68 The rebels managed to push back the regime forces in the Jebel Nafusa mountains and in Misrata. When becoming aware of the French airdrop of arms to Libyan rebels, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reacted by saying that 'If this is confirmed, it is a very crude violation of UN Security Council resolution 1970 [which imposes an arms embargo on Libya]'. 69 While the rebels grew stronger, the effectiveness of the Libyan government in maintaining control over its own forces declined due to NATO air strikes wiping out command-and-control centres and infrastructure. The rebels then initiated a more aggressive military approach attacking cities and towns held by Qaddafi's forces. When the rebels advanced to Qaddafi-held territories, including Tripoli, Bani Walid and Sirte, NATO and its allies launched air strikes in the same areas. Media reported that sleeper cells had been set up within Tripoli, armed with weapons smuggled in by the rebels. On 20 August 2011 the sleeper cells were activated and there was a closely coordinated operation between the rebels on the ground and NATO, launching precision strikes in the area. 70 The same day Tripoli fell to the rebels. On 20 October Qaddafi was killed and on 27 October the Security Council adopted Resolution 2016, terminating the protection of civilians and the no-fly zone of Resolution 1973. 71 By providing close air support for the rebels' advances into cities held by Qaddafi's forces, NATO wiped out Libyan military forces defending those cities. NATO's air strikes assisted the rebels in conquering new areas and finally in bringing down the Qaddafi regime. This raises the question of whether the coalition lawfully could provide such aerial support for rebel operations on the ground.
Any armed assistance provided for by NATO was limited by the mandate in Resolution 1973. As already stated, the resolution did not cover regime change or general human rights protection in Libya. NATO was solely and exclusively authorized to protect 'civilians and civilian populated areas' under 'threat of attack'. The areas held by Qaddafi were obviously not under threat of attack by him. When the rebels advanced on cities held by Qaddafi's forces it was the rebels themselves who posed a threat of attack on civilians and civilian populated areas. 72 Moreover, the coordination between the rebels and NATO while the rebels advanced on Qaddafi-held territories, witnessed NATO taking sides in the conflict. The traditional UN principle of impartiality implies that when the Security Council authorizes the use of force in situations of armed conflict, unless otherwise specified, the intervening states should remain neutral towards the political aims of the parties of the conflict. 73 Evidently during the Libyan conflict, NATO and its allies acted solely on the part of the rebels, although the mandate did not take sides in the conflict.
The legal basis for NATO air strikes in this phase was arguably consent by the rebels as the new effective government of Libya, rather than Resolution 1973. But neither the UN mandate nor consent would provide a basis for NATO's use of force to assist the rebels with the offensive. While Resolution 1973 had the defensive purpose of protecting civilians, consent from the rebels would only be relevant once they had secured sufficient control of Libyan territory. Moreover, there is general agreement that the right of 'intervention by invitation' does not apply in cases of civil war. 74 While it is easy to understand that NATO for military and political reasons wanted to overcome the stalemate between Qaddafi and the rebels, the air support for the Libyan rebels to advance on Qaddafi-held territories went beyond the mandate of Resolution 1973 and thus violated the prohibition against the use of force under the UN Charter article 2(4).
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Operation Unified Protector in Libya showed the commitment of the international community to the protection of civilians. The responsibility to protect was operationalized and implemented in practice through Resolution 1970 and 1973. The international community was relieved by the ousting of the brutal Qaddafi regime.
But the claims of military overreach of the UN mandate by the NATO states may represent a threat to the viability of the responsibility to protect. The reluctance of the four BRIC countries was already striking at the adoption of Resolution 1973. And the long-term consequences of the Libyan intervention are far from settled. Politically, the authorization to use armed force in Libya and the following military expansion of the mandate by NATO have created a suspicion towards western humanitarian intervention which might be a barrier to implementation of the responsibility to protect elsewhere. For instance, the Deputy Minister of the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Ebrahim Ebrahim, has held that the manner in which NATO 'misinterpreted and misused' Resolution 1973 left South Africa with a sense of betrayal towards the UK, US and France. 75 South Africa and Russia 76 are among the countries that have demanded a thorough investigation into the legality of the NATO operation in Libya.
The lack of a consistent, united and efficient international response to the current conflict in Syria may be contrasted with the international reaction to the Libyan crisis, and further conclusions drawn. In the Syrian context, as early as 15 March 2011 the first peaceful demonstrations against the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad started. The regime quickly responded with forcible measures to crush the unrest. 77 At the end of April 2011 the revolt in Syria already displayed similar features to the Libyan uprising at the time the Security Council decided to intervene militarily to protect the civilian population there. By September 2012 the Commission of Inquiry on Syria presented its latest report on the situation in Syria to the Human Rights Council. The Commission held that the intensity of the conflict had reached the legal threshold for a noninternational armed conflict. It found reasonable grounds to believe that Government forces and militias had committed crimes against humanity, war crimes and gross violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law and that antiGovernment armed groups had committed war crimes. 78 Russia, China as well as Brazil, India and South Africa have been opposed or reluctant to adopt strong Security Council resolutions against Syria. Speaking in a council meeting on Syria on 4 October 2011, the representative of Russia stated that the Syrian situation cannot be considered separately from the Libyan experience, worrying that the NATO interpretation of the Security Council Resolutions on Libya is a model for future actions of NATO in implementing the responsibility to protect and that NATO 'may begin to apply this "exemplary model" in Syria'. 79 The representative of SouthAfrica has also highlighted that Security Council resolutions recently have 'been abused' and that 'their implementations have gone far beyond the mandate of what was intended'. South Africa was concerned that the draft resolution on Syria was 'aimed at once again instituting regime change', with a clear reference to Libya. 80 The three vetoes by Russia and China on the situation in Syria, first on 4 October 2011, 81 then on
